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SURVEY SECTION
Civil Procedure/Tort Law. Shepardson v. Consolidated Medical
Equipment, Inc., 714 A.2d 1181 (R.I. 1998). In a medical malprac-
tice action where one of three joint tortfeasors settles with the
plaintiffs prior to the end of their case-in-chief, the trial justice
must instruct the jury that the liability of the remaining defend-
ants is to be reduced by the settlement amount.
In Shepardson v. Consolidated Medical Equipment, Inc.,' the
Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a
trial justice must charge a jury regarding a settlement that took
place between the plaintiff and one of the joint tortfeasors prior to
the end of the plaintiffs case-in-chief.2 If a plaintiff settles with
one joint tortfeasor prior to the conclusion of the trial, the remain-
ing joint tortfeasors are entitled to a jury charge that properly allo-
cates the amount of liability to the settling joint tortfeasor, thus
reducing the amount of total liability of the remaining joint
tortfeasors. 3
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In 1990, Billy Shepardson (Billy), a three year old child, had
been suffering from repeated ear infections. 4 After being diag-
nosed by his pediatrician, Billy had surgery to insert tubes in his
ears and have his tonsils and adenoids removed.6 Dr. Zaki per-
formed the surgery at St. Joseph Hospital on January 16, 1990.6
The intended part of the procedure had gone well; however, Dr.
Zaki informed Mr. and Mrs. Shepardson that, in the course of the
procedure, something had gone wrong.7 The Shepardsons were in-
formed that their son had been severely burned8 by the grounding
pad of the electrosurgical unit 9 used during the operation.10
1. 714 A.2d 1181 (R.I. 1998).
2. See id. at 1183.
3. See id.; see also R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 10-6-2, -3, -7 (1956) (1994 Reenactment)
(defining joint tortfeasors, depicting the right of contribution from joint tortfeasors
based on their pro rata degrees of liability, and illustrating the effect of release of
one tortfeasor on the liability of the other tortfeasors).




8. Billy had "suffered second- and third-degree burns on his right anterior
thigh." Id.
9. The court explained that:
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Mrs. Shepardson stated that, when she first saw Billy's
wound, it looked like raw flesh." Billy Shepardson and his par-
ents then filed suit against Dr. Zaki, the hospital and the electro-
surgical unit's manufacturer, Consolidated Medical Equipment,
Inc. 12 Billy filed suit for injuries suffered as a result of the bums,
and his parents sued for loss of consortium. 13 At trial, Mrs. Shep-
ardson testified about the extent of her sons injuries and the care
that was necessary.' 4 Mrs. Shepardson told the court that the se-
verity of the burns required that Billy's bandages be removed and
redressed two to three times a day.15 This ritual lasted for several
weeks. 16 The changing of the bandages was extremely painful,
causing Billy to scream each time.17 Billy became fearful of his
parents, which forced them to place him under sedation prior to
changing his bandages.' 8
Mrs. Shepardson further testified that Billy's pain did not end
after the burn had healed. 19 There was scarring from the burns,
which caused Billy to become extremely self conscious, refusing to
wear any clothing that would not completely cover the scar.20 In
addition, the Shepardsons had to watch their three year old son
suffere as a result of these burns.2 '
Prior to the end of plaintiffs' case-in-chief, St. Joseph Hospital
settled with the Shepardsons for ninety thousand dollars in ex-
An electrosurgical unit, which is similar to a generator, is plugged into an
electrical outlet in the operating room to provide an electrical current for
use by the surgeon. This unit uses high-frequency electrical current to
heat the tissue where the surgeon is working in order to cut the tissue or
to cause coagulation. One of the attachments to the unit is for a ground-
ing pad that is placed on the patient so that the electrical current may be
dispersed and travel back to the machine.
Id. at 1182 n.1.
10. See id. at 1182.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 1182-83.





19. See id. at 1182-83.
20. See id. at 1183.
21. See id.
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change for a release from liability.22 An order relating to the set-
tlement was entered by the trial justice which stated that the
remaining defendants were entitled to any benefits afforded by the
joint tortfeasor statute.23 At the end of the trial, the justice failed
to instruct the jury that it must "consider and determine the extent
of the negligence . . . attributable to the hospital and thereafter
apportion liability among [the remaining] joint tortfeasors accord-
ingly."24 The trial justice failed to make the instruction despite the
aforementioned order and a request that was made by each of the
remaining defense counsels at the end of the jury charge. 25 The
trial justice stated that there was no need to instruct the jury pur-
suant to the joint tortfeasor statute because the hospital was no
longer a party to the action. 26
The jury ruled in Consolidated Medical Equipment's favor, but
ruled against Dr. Zaki.27 The jury awarded the plaintiffs $125,000
to Billy and $25,000 to each of Billy's parents for loss of consor-
tium. 28 The trial justice denied Dr. Zaki's motion for new trial and
motion to vacate, alter, or amend the judgment. Subsequently, Dr.
Zaki appealed the verdict, relying on the argument that the trial
justice erred in not instructing the jury on the hospital's negli-
gence, pursuant to the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act.2 9
22. See id.; see also R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-6-7 (1956) (1994 Reenactment) (stat-
ing the effect of a release upon the settling tortfeasor and the remaining
tortfeasors).
23. See Shepardson, 714 A.2d at 1183. The trial justice stated that it was the
"intention of this Court to give the remaining defendants the full benefit of the
joint tortfeasor statute, so called." Id.
24. Id.
25. See id. The trial justice refused the request made by the remaining joint
tortfeasors, Dr. Zaki and Consolidated Medical Equipment, Inc., because defense
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ANALYsis AND HOLDING
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act
Under Rhode Island General Laws section 10-6-2, Dr. Zaki
and St. Joseph Hospital are considered joint tortfeasors.30 The re-
lease of the hospital from liability did not subsequently release the
liability of Dr. Zaki because the settlement did not expressly state
this as a term.3 ' The liability of Dr. Zaki and Consolidated Medi-
cal Equipment, Inc. is to be reduced by the amount of consideration
paid by the hospital for its release. 32 The Rhode Island Supreme
Court stated that the failure to instruct the jury regarding this re-
duction of liability constitutes reversible error.33
The Shepardsons maintain that the defendants waived their
right to such an instruction because they failed to submit their re-
quest prior to the trial justice charging the jury.34 The supreme
court ruled that there was no merit to this claim citing Rule 51(b)
of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. 35 Rule 51(b) states
that:
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time during the
trial as the court reasonably directs, any party may file writ-
ten requests that the court instruct the jury on the law set
forth in the requests. No party may assign as error the giving
or the failure to give an instruction unless the party objects
thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating
30. See id. (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-6-2 (1956) (1997 Reenactment)); see also
Cooney v. Molis, 640 A.2d 527, 528 (R.I. 1994) (providing for the right of contribu-
tion among joint tortfeasors and the effect of release on liability). Section 10-6-2
states that the term joint tortfeasors means "two (2) or more persons jointly or
severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, whether or not
judgement has been recovered against all or some of them; provided, however, that
a master and servant or principal and agent shall be considered a single
tortfeasor." R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-6-2 (1956) (1997 Reenactment).
31. See id. (citing Cooney, 640 A.2d at 529); see also R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-6-7
(1956) (1997 Reenactment) (stating that the discharge of one tortfeasor does not
discharge the other tortfeasors).
32. See Shepardson, 714 A.2d at 1183-84; see also R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-6-7
(1956) (1997 Reenactment) (illustrating that the plaintiffs' claim is to be reduced
by the amount paid by the tortfeasor in consideration for their release from
liability).
33. See Shepardson, 714 A.2d at 1184.
34. See id.
35. See id.
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distinctly the matter to which the party objects and the
grounds of the party's objection. 36
The supreme court ruled that the request made by Dr. Zaki,
although preceeding the jury instruction, was sufficient to make
the trial justice aware that the jury should be instructed on the
negligence of the hospital.37 Thus, the failure of the trial justice to
instruct the jury on the negligence of the hospital and the terms of
the release pursuant to the language of the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act was a reversible error.38
Damages
After ordering a new trial, the supreme court decided to ad-
dress the issue of damages raised by Dr. Zaki.39 Dr. Zaki claimed
that he was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law against Billy
and his parents. First, Dr. Zaki claimed that Billy was not entitled
to recover for the scars on his leg and the future medical expenses
necessary for concealing those scars at a later date.40 Second, Dr.
Zaki claimed that Billy's parents could not recover because the evi-
dence presented did not support an award for loss of society dam-
ages. 41 The supreme court ruled against Dr. Zaki on both issues
advanced by this section of the appeal.
With regard to Billy's future damages, the plaintiffs presented
Howard S. Sturim, M.D.42 Dr. Sturim testified that Billy would
likely have to undergo six to twelve procedures on his leg to allevi-
ate the scarring effects. 43 At trial the defendants vehemently ob-
jected to this testimony. The defendants believed that an
economist would be a much better witness to testify to the present
day value of the procedures, and that Dr. Sturim could not testify
with precision as to the value of the future procedures. 44 The
supreme court rejected this argument, stating that the court had
never denied a plaintiff entitlement to future medical damages
when the value of those future damages was not calculated with
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"mathematical precision."45 Reasonably foreseeable damages have
always been awarded in negligence actions. 46 The supreme court
ruled that it was reasonably foreseeable that a three-year-old child
such as Billy, who has scarring, would have corrective surgery at
some time in the future.47 The court was satisfied that the testi-
mony from the doctor was adequate to support an award of future
damages to Billy.48
Next, Dr. Zaki claimed that Mr. and Mrs. Shepardson had
presented no evidence for their claim of loss of consortium. 49 The
supreme court once again disagreed with Dr. Zaki, determining
that since the parents had to care for their son's burns, endure the
pain they inflicted on him while caring for the burns, and watch
their son suffer and inflict the pain, they were entitled to damages
for the injuries suffered.50
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court interpreted the Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act to provide that when a settle-
ment is reached between the plaintiff and a lone tortfeasor, the re-
maining tortfeasor is entitled to a jury instruction stating that his
or her liability is reduced in proportion to the liability released in
the settlement agreement. In addition, the court ruled that a trial
justice need not receive an actual request for the "liability reducing
jury instruction." Thus, it is reversible error if the trial justice
does not give the required instruction.
Tyler J. Savage
45. Id. (citing Pescatore v. Macintosh, 319 A.2d 21, 26 n.5 (R.I. 1974); Labree
v. Major, 306 A.2d 808, 819-20 (R.I. 1973)).
46. See id.
47. See id. Dr. Sturim testified that it would be necessary to perform six to
twelve procedures, and that the cost of each of the procedures could be approxi-
mated. Although he did not testify as to the exact cost of each procedure, he did
state that these numbers could be estimated quite readily. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 1184-85.
50. See id.
